Telling it like it is: Philosophy as Descriptive Manifestation

What do Ross’s The Right and the Good; Chisholm’s Theory of Knowledge; Kripke’s Naming and Necessity; and Audi’s The Architecture of Reason have in common? They all advance important philosophical positions, but not so much via analytic arguments as via formal schemas, distinctions, examples, and analogies. They use such formal schemas, etc, to describe the world so as to make some aspect of it manifest. That is, they simply try to ‘tell it like it is’. This ‘method of descriptive manifestation’ is less commonly recognized than it should be given its divergence from the self-image of analytic philosophy.
Keywords philosophical methodology  metaphilosophy  descriptive manifestation  argumentation  Audi, Robert  Chisholm, R.M.  Kripke, S.  Ross, W.D.  Purtill, R.  intuition
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