Philosophical Psychology 2 (March):129-41 (1989)

Abstract
Having, in previous papers, distinguished at least three forms of consciousness , I now further examine their differences. This examination has some surprising results. Having argued that neither C1 nor C2 is a phenomenological state?and so different from CN?I now show that CN itself is best thought of as a subclass of a larger state . CS is the set of image?representation states. CN is that set of CS states that we are also C2 about. I argue that CN states should be considered a subset of CS states because they share with other CS states imagistic representational powers as opposed to the sentential ones of C1 and C2. And I argue that there are good reasons to consider any state which utilises imagistic representation as a sensation. I then show that the notion of an unconscious sensation makes sense if we think of it as a CS state that is not C2. More radically, I conclude that either it makes sense to say that there are unfelt sensations or there are felt sensations we are not conscious about. While there are good reasons for saying one or the other of these surprising things, I argue that the second, more radical sounding, alternative is actually better motivated?and not quite so surprising as it sounds
Keywords Introspection  Metaphysics  Perception  Philosophical Psychology  Sensation  Unconscious
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DOI 10.1080/09515088908572969
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References found in this work BETA

Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Image and Mind.Stephen M. Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.
Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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