Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34 (1993)

Abstract
When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Philosophy  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289744
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Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Reconsidering Pain.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):325-43.
In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
Why “Consciousness” Means What It Does.Neil C. Manson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117.

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