What is consciousness?

Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34 (1993)
Abstract
When philosophers and psychologists think about consciousness, they generally focus on one or more of three features: phenomenality , intentionality , and introspectibility . Using examples from empirical psychology and neuroscience, I argue that consciousness is not a unitary state, that, instead, these three features characterize different and dissociable states, which often happen to occur together. Understanding these three features as dissociable from each other will resolve philosophical disputes and facilitate scientific investigation
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Philosophy  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289744
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Why “Consciousness” Means What It Does.Neil C. Manson - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):98-117.
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Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
Searle's Argument That Intentional States Are Conscious States.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.

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