Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments?

Argumentation 17 (1):35-42 (2003)
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Abstract

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false

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Mark T. Nelson
Westmont College

Citations of this work

Is, Ought, and the Regress Argument.Jacob Sparks - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):528-543.
Good News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics.Scott Hill - 2009 - Argumentation 23 (2):277-283.
Reflection and the Individual in Williams’ Humanistic Philosophy.Lorenzo Greco - 2013 - In Alexandra Perry & Chris Herrera (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 26-39.

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References found in this work

What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.
The refutation of realism.W. T. Stace - 1934 - Mind 43 (170):145-155.

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