Abstract

The point of departure for this dissertation is an enquiry into the relationship of theoretical and practical reason in Kant. This enquiry confirms that Kant's statement that reason always remains one and the same, differing only in its employment. This is to say, there is an essential structural identity between theoretical and practical reason in Kant. Furthermore, this conception of reason is held to be paradigmatic for all of modern thought. ;This conception of reason, namely, that it is one and the same, is then elaborated and explicated by way of a comparison with the Greek view. This is done not only in terms of their respective notions of reason, but also in terms of the realms in which reason is engaged, such realms being those of science and ethics. Here, the nature of reason in its modern conception--a nature which is decidedly different from the classical view of reason--is disclosed. ;Reason, in its modern conception is a univocal, spontaneous, methodical activity. It embodies and enacts a poietical activity. This view sees reason as a "craftsman" of objective and certain truth; it is a projecting-productive process. In a sense, reason now embodies the Cartesian rules which were to direct the mind, enacting them, functioning according to their univocal method. ;In this characterization of reason, especially in its poietical character, the origin of technology can be found. Technology here means the projective activity of research and experimentation, i.e., it refers to that view of knowledge whereby reason is a projective activity which constructs that which is known. In this way, reason is seen to embody the idea of technology. ;Having disclosed reason to be one and the same, its sameness residing in its constant and univocal poietical activity, the implications of this view are examined. The main difficulty resulting from this is the following: since science, ethics, and technology are projects of one and the same rational activity, an essential, rational-deductive critique of science or technology by ethics is not possible. Reason would find itself unable to undertake such a critique without coming into conflict with itself. Here, reason, as always one and the same, is one-legged. The move of one employment of reason against another would cause the whole argument collapse, leaving the critique no leg to stand on. ;Without proposing any definite solutions, the dissertation ends with other implications of this modern view and attempts to suggest a new direction thought might take in order to avoid or resolve these dilemmas