Are only mental phenomena intentional?

Analysis 68 (3):205–215 (2008)
Anders Nes
Høgskolen I Innlandet
I question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue they either fail to exclude all non-mental phenomena or are so demanding that they ground new, serious challenges to the claim that qualitative states of mind are intentional.
Keywords Mark of the mental  Intentionality
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DOI 10.1093/analys/68.3.205
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.

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Reply to Nes.Tim Crane - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):215–218.
Reply to Tanney.T. Crane - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6.
Actual Consciousness.Ted Honderich - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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