Analysis 68 (299):205-215 (2008)
AbstractI question Brentano's thesis that all and only mental phenomena are intentional. The common gloss on intentionality in terms of directedness does not justify the claim that intentionality is sufficient for mentality. One response to this problem is to lay down further requirements for intentionality. For example, it may be said that we have intentionality only where we have such phenomena as failure of substitution or existential presupposition. I consider a variety of such requirements for intentionality. I argue they either fail to exclude all non-mental phenomena or are so demanding that they ground new, serious challenges to the claim that qualitative states of mind are intentional.
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Citations of this work
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References found in this work
Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.