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Narrow Structuralism: Paving a Middle Path Between Cummins and Millikan
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):109-123 (2017)
Abstract
Millikan [2000] has levelled a number of persuasive criticisms against Cummins's [1996] theory of mental representation. In this paper, I pave a middle path in the debate between Cummins [2000] and Millikan [2000] to answer two questions. How are representations applied to targets? How is the content of a representation determined? The result is a new theory of mental representation, which I call narrow structuralism.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Structural representation and the two problems of content.Jonny Lee - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):606-626.
References found in this work
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
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