A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction

Philosophy of Science 90 (2):288-306 (2023)
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The framework of Solomonoff prediction assigns prior probability to hypotheses inversely proportional to their Kolmogorov complexity. There are two well-known problems. First, the Solomonoff prior is relative to a choice of Universal Turing machine. Second, the Solomonoff prior is not computable. However, there are responses to both problems. Different Solomonoff priors converge with more and more data. Further, there are computable approximations to the Solomonoff prior. I argue that there is a tension between these two responses. This is because computable approximations to Solomonoff prediction do not always converge.

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Sven Neth
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley

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