Synthese:1-15 (forthcoming)

Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is sometimes read as providing a response to the skeptical puzzle from closure, according to which our commitment to the trustworthiness of our evidence is not itself evidentially grounded. In this paper, I argue both that this standard reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, and that a more accurate reading of Wittgenstein provides us with a more plausible solution to the Closure Puzzle.
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-02061-0
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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