Contextualism and the problem of the external world


Authors
Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs about the external world. These considerations do not threaten the truth of our ordinary attributions of evidence, however, for such attributions are context-sensitive in their semantics. It is argued that this solution to the problem of the external world enjoys all of the benefits, and suffers none of the problems, of other solutions to the problem of the external world
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00241.x
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
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Citations of this work BETA

The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.
Experience and Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):699-747.
Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
Deception and Evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

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