Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406 (2004)
In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state sufﬁces for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s conﬁdent belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false
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References found in this work BETA
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Citations of this work BETA
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.
Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345--361.
Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of What Is Said.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.
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