The nature and reach of privileged access

In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press (2008)

Authors
Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Many philosophers accept a “privileged access” thesis concerning our own present mental states and mental events. According to these philosophers, if I am in mental state (or undergoing mental event) M, then – at least in many cases – I have privileged access to the fact that I am in (or undergoing) M. For instance, if I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap, then (in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I now believe that my cat is sitting on my lap. Similarly, if I now imagine a parade coming down Main Street, then (again, in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that I am now imagining a parade coming down Main Street. And again, if it now visually appears to me as if there is a cloud in the sky, then (again, in normal circumstances) I have privileged access to the fact that it now visually appears to me as if there is a cloud in the sky. In each of these aforementioned cases, if circumstances are normal, then, these philosophers say, I have a distinctive kind of privileged epistemic access to facts about my own mental states or events. Of course, I don’t have privileged epistemic access to all facts about my own mental states or events. For instance, I don’t have privileged epistemic access to facts about which unconscious mental states or events I have. But I do have privileged epistemic access to many facts about my own mental states or events, and in particular to the various facts listed above.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,636
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
A Simple Theory of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.
A Puzzle About Desire.Jared Peterson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3655-3676.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Neo-Expressivism: Avowals' Security and Privileged Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 2008 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Desire and Self-Knowledge.Jordi Fernández - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517 – 536.
Reliabilism and Privileged Access.Kourken Michaelian - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:69-109.
Seeing What You're Doing.John Gibbons - 2010 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Burge's Self-Knowledge.Ted A. Warfield - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):169-178.
Privileged Access Naturalized.Jordi Fernandez - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):352-372.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
16 ( #651,223 of 2,462,232 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,178 of 2,462,232 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes