Undermining the case for contrastivism

Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A number of philosophers have recently defended “contrastivist” theories of knowledge, according to which knowledge is a relation between at least the following three relata: a knower, a proposition, and a contrast set. I examine six arguments that Jonathan Schaffer has given for this thesis, and show that those arguments do not favour contrastivism over a rival view that I call “evidentiary relativism”. I then argue that evidentiary relativism accounts for more data than does contrastivism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,330

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys.Keith DeRose - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
The knowledge relation: Binary or ternary?René van Woudenberg - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281-288.
From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Contrastivism and lucky questions.Kelly Becker - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (2):245-260.
Contrastivism in epistemology.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.
Contrastivism and closure.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.
Cheap knowledge and easy questions.Martin Montminy - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):127-146.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-04

Downloads
133 (#124,855)

6 months
3 (#424,136)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.
The Contrast-sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
Contrastive Self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.

View all 10 references / Add more references