Res Publica 6 (3):285-299 (2000)

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant.
Keywords Kant  liberalism  libertarianism  Nozick  Rawls  respect for persons
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DOI 10.1023/A:1009619600489
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Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kant's Moral Philosophy.Robert N. Johnson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Respect and Loving Attention.Carla Bagnoli - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):483-515.

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