Psychological Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts

Philosophy Compass 17 (5):e12823 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Psychological essentialism is the hypothesis that humans represent some categories as having an underlying essence that unifies members of a category and is causally responsible for their typical attributes and behaviors. Throughout the past several decades, psychological essentialism has emerged as an extremely active area of research in cognitive science. More recently, it has also attracted attention from philosophers, who put the empirical results to use in many different philosophical areas, ranging from philosophy of mind and cognitive science to social philosophy. This article aims to give philosophers who are new to the topic an overview of the key empirical findings surrounding psychological essentialism, and some of the ways the hypothesis and its related findings have been discussed, extended, and applied in philosophical research.

Similar books and articles

Artifacts and Essentialism.Susan A. Gelman - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):449-463.
The essence of essentialism.George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):585-605.
Naturalizing Kinds.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 115.
Essentialism, Externalism, and Human Nature.M. J. Cain - 2012 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 70:29-51.
New Essentialism in Biology.Olivier Rieppel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):662-673.
On the functional orgins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (1):1-30.
On the functional origins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 2 (1):1-30.
The metaphysics of natural kinds.Alexander Bird - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1397-1426.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-02-14

Downloads
149 (#86,049)

6 months
17 (#61,575)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Eleonore Neufeld
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Are we Teleologically Essentialist?Sehrang Joo & Sami R. Yousif - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (11):e13202.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The meaning of 'meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
The Construction of Human Kinds.Ron Mallon - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.

View all 63 references / Add more references