Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 87:195-211 (2013)
AbstractRichard Sorabji and Myles Burnyeat have developed and defended rival interpretations of Aristotle’s account of sensation. Both agree in accepting the common terms of Aristotle’s account , but they disagree about how these terms are to be understood. In this paper I consider these rival interpretations, examining the best arguments for each and raising new objections to both. I argue that each contemporary interpretation, in its own way, faces the same problem—the inability to accommodate everything that Aristotle says in his account of sensation. In the search for an alternative interpretation I suggest turning to the medieval tradition, and particularly to the interpretation developed by Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. I argue that Aquinas’s interpretation deserves more attention because it retains the best features of its two contemporary rivals while avoiding the problems facing each
Similar books and articles
Unmixing the Intellect: Aristotle on the Cognitive Powers and Bodily Organs.Joseph M. Magee - 2003 - Greenwood Press.
Sense Organs and the Activity of Sensation in Aristotle.Joseph Magee - 2000 - Phronesis 45 (4):306 - 330.
Reconsidering Contentious Argument: Augustus DeMorgan on Fallacy. [REVIEW]Marie J. Secor - 2003 - Argumentation 17 (2):131-143.
Brentano's Argument against Aristotle for the Immateriality of the Soul.Susan Krantz - 1988 - Brentano Studien 1:63-74.
On Aristotle's "on Sense Perception". Alexander & Alexander of Aphrodisias - 2000 - Cornell University Press.
Matter, sensation, and understanding.Moreland Perkins - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1):1-12.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads