Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):61 - 86 (2004)

Jay Newhard
East Carolina University
Recently, Paul Horwich has developed the minimalist theory of truth, according to which the truth predicate does not express a substantive property, though it may be used as a grammatical expedient. Minimalism shares these claims with Quine’s disquotationalism; it differs from disquotationalism primarily in holding that truth-bearers are propositions, rather than sentences. Despite potential ontological worries, allowing that propositions bear truth gives Horwich a prima facie response to several important objections to disquotationalism. In section I of this paper, disquotationalism is given a careful exegesis, in which seven known objections are traced to the disquotational schema, and two new objections are raised. A version of disquotationalism which avoids two of the seven known objections is recommended. In section II, an examination of minimalism shows that it faces eight of the nine objections facing disquotationalism, plus a new objection. In section III, a finite formulation of minimalism proposed by Ernest Sosa is shown to meet five of the nine objections facing disquotationalism as well as the objection new to minimalism, though it faces another new objection.
Keywords disquotationalism  minimalism  truth  finite minimal theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2004.10716559
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,025
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
Philosophy of Logic.Willard V. O. Quine - 1986 - Philosophy 17 (3):392-393.
Theories of References and Truth.Stephen Leeds - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (1):111 - 129.
The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (6):263-278.
A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Are Truth and Reference Quasi-Disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.
On Horwich's Way Out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.
Parasitic Liar and the Gappy Solution.Richard Wei Tzu Hou - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:63-69.
A Deflationary Theory of Reference.Arvid Båve - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):51 - 73.
Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. [REVIEW]Dirk Greimann - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth.James Dreier - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Minimalism About Truth.Richard Holton - 1993 - In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.


Added to PP index

Total views
37 ( #285,311 of 60,987 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #433,110 of 60,987 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes