Grelling’s Paradox

Philosophical Studies 126 (1):1 - 27 (2005)

Authors
Jay Newhard
East Carolina University
Abstract
Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘ ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The aims of this paper are, first, to offer a precise formulation of Grelling’s Paradox which is clearly distinguished from both the Liar Paradox and Russell’s Paradox; second, to offer a solution to Grelling’s Paradox which both resolves the paradoxical reasoning and accounts for unproblematic predications of heterologicality; and, third, to argue that there are two lessons to be drawn from Grelling’s Paradox which have not yet been drawn from the Liar or Russell’s Paradox. The first lesson is that it is possible for the semantic content of a predicate to be sensitive to the semantic context; i.e., it is possible for a predicate to be an indexical expression. The second lesson is that the semantic content of an indexical predicate, though unproblematic for many cases, can nevertheless be problematic in some cases.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-7808-z
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Nonexistence.Nathan Salmon - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
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Citations of this work BETA

Inexpressible Properties and Grelling’s Antinomy.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):369 - 385.

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