Abstract
Realism as an explanatory theory of science (faded realism) is not convincing. However, neither "internal realism" nor instrumentalism are plausible. Assuming common sense realism a non-explanatory form of scientific realism (modest realism) can be defended. Modest realism has affinities with Fine's NOA. To NOA it adds a descriptive thesis about scientific progress towards truth or verisimilitude. In addition it adds a concern with purely philosophical issues which arise in reflections on the nature of science. However, there is little to say about truth over and above what is conveyed by Tarski/Davidson semantics.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,107
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Piecemeal Realism.Arthur Fine - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):79 - 96.
Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later.Joseph Rouse - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):71-122.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Scientific Realism: The Truth in Pragmatism.Philip Kitcher - 2012 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):171-189.
Realism.Susan Haack - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):275 - 299.
Getting Ontologically Natural.Sami Pihlström - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):247-256.
Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
Horwich on 'Semantic' and 'Metaphysical' Realism.David Davies - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557.
How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
Scientific Realism with a Humean Face.Stathis Psillos - 2011 - In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. London: pp. 75-95.
Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):151-197.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total views
32 ( #342,251 of 2,454,609 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #143,490 of 2,454,609 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes