Modest Realism
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189 (1988)
Abstract
Realism as an explanatory theory of science (faded realism) is not convincing. However, neither "internal realism" nor instrumentalism are plausible. Assuming common sense realism a non-explanatory form of scientific realism (modest realism) can be defended. Modest realism has affinities with Fine's NOA. To NOA it adds a descriptive thesis about scientific progress towards truth or verisimilitude. In addition it adds a concern with purely philosophical issues which arise in reflections on the nature of science. However, there is little to say about truth over and above what is conveyed by Tarski/Davidson semantics.My notes
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Citations of this work
Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
The epistemological status of scientific theories: An investigation of the structural realist account.Ioannis Votsis - 2004 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
New philosophies of science in north America — twenty years later.Joseph Rouse - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):71-122.
Philosophical skepticism not relativism is the problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism.Dimitris P. Papayannakos - 2008 - Science & Education 17 (6):573-611.
