PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189 (1988)
| Abstract |
Realism as an explanatory theory of science (faded realism) is not convincing. However, neither "internal realism" nor instrumentalism are plausible. Assuming common sense realism a non-explanatory form of scientific realism (modest realism) can be defended. Modest realism has affinities with Fine's NOA. To NOA it adds a descriptive thesis about scientific progress towards truth or verisimilitude. In addition it adds a concern with purely philosophical issues which arise in reflections on the nature of science. However, there is little to say about truth over and above what is conveyed by Tarski/Davidson semantics.
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