Georgia State University Master's Theses 2020 (2020)

Gender identity is usually thought of in psychologistic terms. But thinking about gender identity in this way often undermines the political and social agencies of queer and trans individuals who rely on the concept the most. To ameliorate this problem, I argue that we should endorse a conceptual distinction between gender identity and what I call gender orientation. The former is an agent’s sincerely self-ascribed gender categorization, and the latter is an agent’s psychological relation to gendered social practices.
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References found in this work BETA

Gender and Gender Terms.Elizabeth Barnes - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):704-730.
Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.

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