Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345-352 (2009)

Jay Newhard
East Carolina University
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth. The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.” In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
Keywords contextual theory of truth  truth  contextualism  Liar Paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9190-0
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The Therapy of Desire.Martha Nussbaum - 1994 - Princeton University Press.
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox.Robert L. Martin (ed.) - 1984 - Oxford University Press.

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