Two grades of internalism (pass and fail)

Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169 (2005)

Andrew Newman
University of Nebraska, Omaha
Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or reading some of his works).An interesting third view, which I call
Keywords Content  Epistemology  Externalism  Internalism  Mental  Searle, J
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-1291-4
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Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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