A Critique of Dretske’s Conception of State Consciousness

Journal of Philosophical Research 26:187-206 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his recent work, Dretske offers a new account of what it is for a mental state, in particular, a sensory experience, to be conscious. According to Dretske’sproposal, subject S’s experience of object O is conscious if and only if it makes S aware of O. This proposal is argued to be open to only two serious interpretations. The first takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it constitutes S’s awareness of O, whereas the second takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it causes S’s awareness of O. It is argued that neither is a plausible way to understand the nature of state consciousness, because the constitutive interpretation implausibly denies the existence of unconscious veridical experiences, whereas the causal interpretation implausibly casts S’s veridical experience of O, rather than O or a certain external event involving O, as the relevant cause of S’s awareness of O.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Critique of Dretske’s Conception of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26 (January):187-206.
Conscious experience.Fred Dretske - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):263-283.
Intrinsic awareness in Sartre.Frederick B. Mills - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):1-16.
On a Searlean Objection to Rosenthal’s Theory of State Consciousness.A. Minh Nguyen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):83-100.
Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
Self‐awareness and the mind‐brain problem.Gilberto Gomes - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-17

Downloads
14 (#995,076)

6 months
1 (#1,478,781)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references