How Twitter gamifies communication

In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 410-436 (2021)
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Abstract

Twitter makes conversation into something like a game. It scores our communication, giving us vivid and quantified feedback, via Likes, Retweets, and Follower counts. But this gamification doesn’t just increase our motivation to communicate; it changes the very nature of the activity. Games are more satisfying than ordinary life precisely because game-goals are simpler, cleaner, and easier to apply. Twitter is thrilling precisely because its goals have been artificially clarified and narrowed. When we buy into Twitter’s gamification, then our values shift from the complex and pluralistic values of communication, to the narrower quest for popularity and virality. Twitter’s gamification bears some resemblance with the phenomena of echo chambers and moral outrage porn. In all these phenomena, we are instrumentalizing our ends for hedonistic reasons. We have shifted our aims in an activity, not because the new aims are more valuable, but in exchange for extra pleasure.

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Author's Profile

C. Thi Nguyen
University of Utah

Citations of this work

Value Capture.Christopher Nguyen - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (3).
The seductions of clarity.C. Thi Nguyen - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:227-255.
Playfulness versus epistemic traps.C. Thi Nguyen - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.

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References found in this work

Fake News and Partisan Epistemology.Regina Rini - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (S2):43-64.
On Bullshit.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1986 - Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.

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