After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428 (2007)
Abstract
From the first time I encountered the problem of free will in college, it struck me that a clear-eyed view of free will and moral responsibility demanded some form of nihilism. Libertarianism seemed delusional, and compatibilism seemed in bad faith. Hence I threw my lot in with philosophers like Paul d’Holbach, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom who conclude that no one is truly moral responsible. But after two decades of self- identifying as a nihilist, it occurred to me that I had continued to treat my friends
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00131.x
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References found in this work BETA
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement & Defense.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.
Revisionism About Free Will: A Statement and Defense.Manuel Vargas - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):45-62.
More Work for Hard Incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.

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