Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):275-296 (2010)

Abstract
In The Grammar of Society, Bicchieri maintains that behavior in the Ultimatum game (and related economic games) depends on people’s allegiance to ‘social norms’. In this article, I follow Bicchieri in maintaining that an adequate account of people’s behavior in such games must make appeal to norms, including a norm of equal division; I depart from Bicchieri in maintaining that at least part of the population desires to follow such norms even when they do not expect others to follow them. This generates a puzzle, however: why do norms of equal division have such cultural resilience? One possibility is that our natural emotional propensity for envy makes norms of equal division emotionally appealing. An alternative (but complementary) possibility is that deviations from a norm of equal division would naturally be interpreted as threats to status, which would facilitate the moralization of such norms
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/1470594X09345478
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,694
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior.Cristina Bicchieri - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
Tractatus ethico-politicus.Nythamar De Oliveira - 1999 - Porto Alegre, Brazil: Edipucrs.
Tractatus practico-theoreticus.Nythamar De Oliveira - 2016 - Porto Alegre, Brazil: Editora Fi.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-12-20

Total views
127 ( #81,114 of 2,438,590 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #436,491 of 2,438,590 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes