Experimental Philosophy and the Problem of Free Will

Science 331 (6023):1401-1403 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophical problems are rooted in everyday thought, and experimental philosophy uses social scientific techniques to study the psychological underpinnings of such problems. In the case of free will, research suggests that people in a diverse range of cultures reject determinism, but people give conflicting responses on whether determinism would undermine moral responsibility. When presented with abstract questions, people tend to maintain that determinism would undermine responsibility, but when presented with concrete cases of wrongdoing, people tend to say that determinism is consistent with moral responsibility. It remains unclear why people reject determinism and what drives people’s conflicted attitudes about responsibility. Experimental philosophy aims to address these issues and thereby illuminate the philosophical problem of free will.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,601

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Folk intuitions on free will.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):57-86.
Determinism, Randomness, and Value.Noa Latham - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2010 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish, New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.
Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.
Responsibility.Jonathan Glover - 1970 - New York,: Humanities P..

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-19

Downloads
72 (#308,534)

6 months
72 (#87,110)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Shaun Nichols
Cornell University