The Monist 85 (2):285-303 (2002)

Over the last 20 years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral rationalism, the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality (e.g., Gewirth 1978, Darwall 1983, Nagel 1970, 1986, Korsgaard 1986, Singer 1995; Smith 1994, 1997). According to rationalism, morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasies, and this has seemed to many to be the best way of securing a kind of objectivism about moral claims. Consider the following representative statements.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist200285210
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The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.
Moral Responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.
Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral Rationalism?Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):69 – 82.

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