Imagining and believing: The promise of a single code

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2):129-39 (2004)
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Abstract

Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction.

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Shaun Nichols
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Problem of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Szabó Gendler & Shen-yi Liao - 2015 - In Noël Carroll & John Gibson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. New York: Routledge. pp. 405-418.

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References found in this work

Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55.
In defense of the simulation theory.Alvin Goldman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.

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