Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism about Metaphysical Modality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):275-284 (2009)
Abstract
Beall and Restall 2000; 2001; 2006 advocate a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism, according to which there is not one true logic but many equally acceptable logical systems. They maintain that Logical Pluralism is compatible with monism about metaphysical modality, according to which there is just one correct logic of metaphysical modality. Wyatt 2004 contends that Logical Pluralism is incompatible with monism about metaphysical modality. We first suggest that if Wyatt were right, Logical Pluralism would be strongly implausible because it would get upside down a dependence relation that holds between metaphysics and logic of modality. We then argue that Logical Pluralism is prima facie compatible with monism about metaphysical modality
Keywords philosophical logic  metaphysics
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802340626
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References found in this work BETA
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
Which Modal Logic Is the Right One?John P. Burgess - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):81-93.

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