Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions

Noûs 41 (4):663–685 (2007)
Abstract
An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,178
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Modularity of Mind.Jerry Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.

View all 117 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
Folk Intuitions on Free Will.Shaun Nichols - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1):57-86.
Folk Concepts and Intuitions: From Philosophy to Cognitive Science.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (11):514-518.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

568 ( #2,390 of 2,153,537 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

32 ( #9,984 of 2,153,537 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums