Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions

Noûs 41 (4):663–685 (2007)

Abstract
An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,017
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

View all 57 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.

View all 223 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
828 ( #4,471 of 2,310,696 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #24,488 of 2,310,696 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature