Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions

Noûs 41 (4):663–685 (2007)
Authors
Joshua Knobe
Yale University
Shaun Nichols
University of Arizona
Abstract
An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1738 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.

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