Abstract

The general view of pragmatism holds that universal moral norms cannot be justified within a pragmatic perspective. Pragmatism, thus, is associated with relativism. C.I. Lewis says that pragmatism without universal norms is a self-contradiction. I defend the view that there are two dimensions to pragmatism. I claim that Lewis' philosophy encompasses both. I argue that there are two different pragmatic justifications implicit in his philosophy; while one is associated with relativism, the other is not. I call them: "the pragmatic choice of the best" and "the pragmatic justification of the non-repudiable," respectively. What is justified by the first is a choice from alternatives; what is justified by the second is the Categorical Imperative--the imperative to be practically consistent. I argue that the imperative governing ethics is secured as one aspect of, or derivation from, the imperative of practical consistency. I argue that there are ethical alternatives but that this flexibility occurs within the discipline; I propose that pragmatic choice of the best be the determining methodology for selection of an alternative. While the first justification belongs to the dimension of pragmatism as understood by the conventional wisdom, the second belongs to the dimension I call "foundational pragmatism." ;From the Introduction to Chapter 2, I present my position. From Chapter 3 to 7, I explain the structure which underlies and makes possible the two different justifications: this requires a careful, and at times helpful, approach to the way Lewis structures a complex and unified system of norms, knowledge, decisions and choices. In Chapters 8 and 9, I explain how Lewis justifies the Categorical Imperative as pragmatically a priori: I also provide a definition of practical consistency, which is lacking. In Chapters 10 through 12, I develop some ideas connecting the later Wittgenstein, Apel and Winch in order to argue for a convergence between Wittgenstein and Lewis. In the concluding chapter, I argue that Richard Rorty's claim that pragmatism and foundationalism are incompatible is incorrect--indeed, it is not upheld by his own version of pragmatism. By these arguments, I bring Lewis' pragmatism into the contemporary arena of the struggle to ground ethics