Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):582-601 (2002)
I argue that Reid adopts a form of Meinongianism about fictional objects because of, not in spite of, his common sense philosophy. According to 'the way of ideas', thoughts take representational states as their immediate intentional objects. In contrast, Reid endorses a direct theory of conception and a heady thesis of first-person privileged access to the contents of our thoughts. He claims that thoughts about centaurs are thoughts of non-existent objects, not thoughts about mental intermediaries, adverbial states or general concepts. In part this is because of the common sense semantics he adopts for fictional-object terms. I show that it is reasonable for Reid to endorse Meinongianism, given his epistemological priorities, for he took the way of ideas to imply that his view about first-person privileged access to our mental contents was false
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References found in this work BETA
On the Theory of Objects (Translation of 'Über Gegenstandstheorie', 1904).Alexius Meinong - 1960 - In Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Free Press. pp. 76-117.
Reid's Answer to Abstract Ideas.Susan V. Castagnetto - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:39-60.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
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