Reid on fictional objects and the way of ideas
Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):582-601 (2002)
Abstract
I argue that Reid adopts a form of Meinongianism about fictional objects because of, not in spite of, his common sense philosophy. According to 'the way of ideas', thoughts take representational states as their immediate intentional objects. In contrast, Reid endorses a direct theory of conception and a heady thesis of first-person privileged access to the contents of our thoughts. He claims that thoughts about centaurs are thoughts of non-existent objects, not thoughts about mental intermediaries, adverbial states or general concepts. In part this is because of the common sense semantics he adopts for fictional-object terms. I show that it is reasonable for Reid to endorse Meinongianism, given his epistemological priorities, for he took the way of ideas to imply that his view about first-person privileged access to our mental contents was falseDOI
10.1111/1467-9213.00287
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Citations of this work
Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds.Stephen Harrop - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (1):1-18.
Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed.Marina Folescu - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 52-74.
Thomas Reid's philosophy of mind: Consciousness and intentionality.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):279-289.
Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Rebecca Copenhaver & Todd Buras (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.
References found in this work
The Works of Thomas Reid ... with an Account of His Life and Writings.Thomas Reid - 1895 - James Thin Longmans, Green & Co.
On the theory of objects (translation of 'Über Gegenstandstheorie', 1904).Alexius Meinong - 1904 - In Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. pp. 76-117.
Particulars, Individual Qualities, and Universals.Keith Lehrer & Vann McGee - 1992 - In Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 37--47.
Reid’s Answer to Abstract Ideas.Susan V. Castagnetto - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:39-60.