Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):309-319 (2007)

Authors
Philip J. Nickel
Eindhoven University of Technology
Abstract
This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that is, trust held among amoral persons on the basis of amoral grounds. It is also compatible with trust adopted on purely predictive grounds. Then, defending the thesis against a challenge of motivational inefficacy, I argue that obligation-ascription can motivate people to act even in the absence of definite, mutually-known agreements. I end by explaining, briefly, the advantages of this sort of moral account of trust over a view based on reactive attitudes such as resentment.
Keywords Philosophy   Ontology   Political Philosophy   Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-007-9069-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,949
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Practice of Moral Judgment.Barbara Herman - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (8):414-436.
Trust as an Affective Attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
The Cunning of Trust.Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):202-225.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Exploitative Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York City, New York, Vereinigte Staaten: pp. 241-264.
What Is Trust?Thomas W. Simpson - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):550-569.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Trust, Staking, and Expectations.Philip J. Nickel - 2009 - Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (3):345–362.
The Moral Obligations of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):332-345.
Trust in Managed Care Organizations.Allen Buchanan - 2000 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (3):189-212.
Trust: The Scarcest of Medical Resources.Patricia Illingworth - 2002 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):31 – 46.
Creating Trust.Robert C. Solomon - 1998 - Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (2):205-232.
Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good.Marek Kohn - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Trust It!D. Z. Phillips - 1999 - Bijdragen 60 (4):380-392.
Trust, Covert Surveillance and Fiduciary Obligations.Wayne Vaught - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (1):87-92.
Trust in Strangers, Trust in Friends.Jessica Miller - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (1):17-22.
Puzzles About Trust.Doran Smolkin - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):431-449.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
73 ( #141,704 of 59,918 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,700 of 59,918 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes