Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):83-91 (2003)

Nick Bostrom
Oxford University
In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the doomsday argument by appealing to the self–indication assumption (SIA) that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. Unlike earlier users of this strategy, Olum tries to counter objections that have been made against (SIA). We argue that his defence of (SIA) is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the doomsday argument (or the other counter–intuitive results that flow from related thought–experiments). A developed theory of observation selection effects shows why the doomsday argument is inconclusive, and how one can consistently reject both it and (SIA).
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phiq.2003.53.issue-210
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Self-Location and Causal Context.Simon Friederich - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):232-258.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
8 ( #901,757 of 2,325,384 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #667,459 of 2,325,384 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes