Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (3):345–362 (2009)
Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person’s performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking account is preferable to the predictive expectation account on grounds of intuitive adequacy and coherence with plausible explanations of action; and (3) that there are counterexamples to both accounts. I then set forward an additional necessary condition on trust, according to which trust implies a moral expectation. The content of the moral expectation is this: W hen A trusts B to do x, A ascribes an obligation to B to do x, and holds B to this obligation. This moral expectation account throws new light on some of the consequences of misplaced trust. I use the example of physicians’ defensive behavior to illustrate this final point.
|Keywords||defensive medicine moral expectation rationality prediction interpersonal trust|
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Trust and Distrust Between Patient and Doctor.Katherine Hawley - 2015 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (5):798-801.
Can We Make Sense of the Notion of Trustworthy Technology?Philip J. Nickel, Maarten Franssen & Peter Kroes - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (3-4):429-444.
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