Who is mind blind?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):745-746 (2004)
Abstract
The authors attempt to explain the ubiquity and persistence of human religion by invoking innate, domain-specific cognitive furniture, while dismissing the potential of other approaches, such as memetics, to produce “mindful” understandings of religion. This commentary challenges the explanatory adequacy of cognitive nativism, suggesting that memetics has as much claim to utility and “mindfulness” as innate mental modules do. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye? – Matthew 7:3.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X04370172
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