Dialectica 60 (3):321–336 (2006)
I propose a description of one aspect of the philosophical problem about the ontology of colors by formulating and motivating six plausible premises that seem to be hard to deny in isolation but that are jointly incoherent. I briefly sketch a solution and comment on the views presented in this volume from the perspective of the puzzle
|Keywords||Appearance Color Epistemology Transparency Veridicality Vision|
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References found in this work BETA
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Color and Perceptual Variation Revisited: Unknown Facts, Alien Modalities, and Perfect Psychosemantics.Jonathan Cohen - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):307-319.
Citations of this work BETA
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.
Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure.Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346 - 391.
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The Appearance and Nature of Color.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):227-252.
Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
The Evolution of Color Vision Without Colors.Richard J. Hall - 1996 - Philosophy of Science Supplement 63 (3):125-33.
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