Erkenntnis 83 (1):61-87 (2018)

Martine Nida-Rümelin
Université de Fribourg
Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The main purpose of the paper is to show that the view proposed about active behavior leads to a natural compromise between libertarianism and compatibilism, which avoids the flaws of both positions while preserving their central insights.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-016-9872-0
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References found in this work BETA

Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1964 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will. Blackwell.
Freedom Within Reason.Gary Watson - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):890.
Why Agent Causation?Timothy O’Connor - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):143-158.
The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.

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Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):747-764.
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