On Belief about Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism

Abstract
The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the Knowledge Argument. The article distinguishes two rival accounts of the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction and explains how the result of the Knowledge Argument depends upon which of these accounts one wishes to accept.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205  
DOI 10.2307/2653630
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,133
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
There Are No Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
On Belief About Experiences.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
Physicalism and the Argument From Knowledge.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):84-91.
On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.
Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. pp. 55--119.
Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total downloads
35 ( #150,921 of 2,191,816 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #288,547 of 2,191,816 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature