Synthese 195 (8):3361-3387 (2018)

Authors
Martine Nida-Rümelin
Université de Fribourg
Abstract
According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
Keywords Qualia  Phenomenal consciousness  Self-consciousness  Experience property framework  Experiential properties  Dualism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1121-1
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
The Components of Content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
What’s so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):55-82.
On Ambitious Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.
The Relation Between Subjects and Their Conscious Experiences.Henry Taylor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3493-3507.
The Microstructure of Experience.Andrew Y. Lee - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):286-305.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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