Philosophical Inquiries 7 (2):181-202 (2019)

Authors
Katharina Nieswandt
Concordia University
Ulf Hlobil
Concordia University
Abstract
We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept 'happiness' is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn't deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn't imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil.
Keywords neo-Aristotelianism  virtue  deep happiness  practical rationality  virtue egoism  virtue ethics
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References found in this work BETA

On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
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Natural Goodness.Philippa Foot & Peter Geach - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):621-631.
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Morals From Motives.Michael Slote - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):415-418.

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