Authors
Abstract
At the heart of Jürgen Habermas's explication of communicative rationality is the contention that all speech acts oriented to understanding raise three different kinds of validity claims simultaneously: claims to truth, truthfulness, and normative rightness. This paper argues that Habermas presents exactly three distinct, logically independent arguments for his simultaneity thesis: an argument from structure; an argument from criticizability/rejectability; and an argument from understanding/reaching understanding. It is further maintained that the simultaneity thesis receives cogent support only from the Argument from understanding/reaching understanding, and only if the notion of 'understanding' is expanded to that of 'agreement'.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/09672550500080462
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,742
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Is There Any Normative Claim Internal to Stating Facts?Andreas Dorschel - 1988 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 21:5-16.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
32 ( #308,883 of 2,349,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #511,368 of 2,349,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes