A challenge to the phenomenal sufficiency thesis

Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-6 (2022)
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Abstract

Smithies defends the phenomenal sufficiency thesis, according to which every perceptual experience provides immediate, defeasible justification to believe some content in virtue of its phenomenal character alone. This commentary challenges this thesis by presenting two kinds of knowledge, the possession of which seems necessary for perceptual justification.

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Takuya Niikawa
Kobe University

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