Goldstick and O’Neill on" Truer than"

Philosophy of Science 58 (3):491-495 (1991)

Ilkka Niiniluoto
University of Helsinki
In a recent article, Goldstick and O'Neill propose a definition for the comparative "truer than" relation between rival propositions. This definition is studied here in a context where the concept of "convexity" is well defined for propositions. It turns out that the Goldstick-O'Neill definition gives a reasonable but very restricted sufficient condition for the "truer than" relation, but fails as a necessary condition
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DOI 10.1086/289631
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Revising Beliefs Towards the Truth.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):165-181.

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