International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):181 – 189 (1990)
Abstract This paper argues that both technological determinism (the development of technology is uniquely determined by internal laws) and technological voluntarism (technological change can be externally directed and regulated by the wants and free choice of human beings) are one?sided and partly mistaken. The determinists are right in the sense that technology has a power to influence our values and behaviour, and thereby appear to direct ?technological imperatives? to us. However, such commands are always conditional on some value premises; the voluntarists are thus right in pointing out that we need not obey such imperatives. The principle ?Can implies Ought? (all technological possibilities should be realized) is therefore invalid
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References found in this work BETA
Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science.Jon Elster - 1983 - Universitetsforlaget.
Citations of this work BETA
La Biología Sintética y El Imperativo de Mejoramiento.Antonio Diéguez - 2016 - Isegoría 55:503.
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