On being systematically connectionist

Mind and Language 9 (3):288-302 (1994)
In 1988 Fodor and Pylyshyn issued a challenge to the newly-popular connectionism: explain the systematicity of cognition without merely implementing a so-called classical architecture. Since that time quite a number of connectionist models have been put forward, either by their designers or by others, as in some measure demonstrating that the challenge can be met (e.g., Pollack, 1988, 1990; Smolensky, 1990; Chalmers, 1990; Niklasson and Sharkey, 1992; Brousse, 1993). Unfortu- nately, it has generally been unclear whether these models actually do have this implication (see, for instance, the extensive philosophical debate in Smolensky, 1988; Fodor and McLaughlin, 1990; van Gelder, 1990, 1991; McLaughlin, 1993a, 1993b; Clark, 1993). Indeed, we know of no major supporter of classical orthodoxy who has felt compelled, by connectionist models and argu- ments, to concede in print that connectionists have in fact delivered a non-classical explanation of systematicity
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1994.tb00227.x
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References found in this work BETA
On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Finding Structure in Time.Jeffrey L. Elman - 1990 - Cognitive Science 14 (2):179-211.

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Citations of this work BETA
Systematicity Revisited.Robert F. Hadley - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (4):431-44.
Cognition, Systematicity, and Nomic Necessity.Robert F. Hadley - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):137-53.

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