Welfarism – The Very Idea

Utilitas 15 (2):151 (2003)
Abstract
According to outcome welfarism, roughly, the value of an outcome is fundamentally a matterof the individual welfare it contains. I assess various suggestions as to how to spell out this idea more fully on the basis of some basic intuitions about the content and implications of welfarism. I point out that what are in fact different suggestions are often conflated and argue that none fully captures the basic intuitions. I then suggest that what this means is that different doctrines of welfarism may be appropriate in different contexts and that when deciding on a particular doctrine, we need to consider which intuitions it does accommodate. Finally, I consider the issue of just how a benefit must be related to an outcome in order to contribute to its value
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820800003927
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Welfarism.Simon Keller - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):82-95.
Equality, Priority and Global Justice.Nils Holtug - 2009 - Journal of Global Ethics 5 (3):173 – 179.

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