Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (2):238-250 (2009)

Abstract
Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language.
Keywords moral nature  moral convention  origin of moral consciousness  道德本性  道德约定  道德意识的起源
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DOI 10.1007/s11466-009-0015-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Theory of Moral Sentiments.Adam Smith - 1759 - Dover Publications.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.

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Feeling as the origin of value in Scheler and Mencius.Nam-In Lee - 2020 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (2):141-155.

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